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 Abstract 
In this paper we develop a theory of the impact of behavioral decision making 
factors on the evaluation of logistic service providers under performance-based logistics 
and provide an analysis of pilot data collected in an attempt to find support for that 
theory.  Based on a review of the logistic measurement, PBL, and behavioral decision 
making literature, we form four hypotheses about specific impacts of process measures 
and variance on performance evaluation in PBL.  Our first hypothesis is that the 
difficulty of relating component-level measures to system-level outcomes will lead to an 
increased use of non-diagnostic or only partially diagnostic process measures.  We 
further propose that these process measures will produce a dilution effect in which 
system outcomes are undervalued.  Our third hypothesis is that absent clear, 
observable outcome metrics at the component level, decision makers will increasingly 
rely on measures of inputs as surrogates for outputs.  Our fourth hypothesis is that 
absent a specific guidance on how to value variance, decision makers will tend to 
overlook this important component of performance.  We report results from a pilot test 
conducted to develop an instrument that will be used to try to find support for 
hypotheses two and four. 
Keywords:  Performance-based Logistics, PBL, Behavioral Decision Making, 
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 Executive Summary 
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) is an initiative that the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has targeted for ‘aggressive implementation’ in FY 2006-2009 
(Wolfowitz 2004).  It is an initiative intended to improve weapon system logistics 
outcomes, and reduced weapon system lifecycle costs. Provider evaluation in PBL is 
intended to center on clearly specified outcome metrics, and mutually-agreed upon 
goals on those metrics (DUSD-LMR 2001) with the idea that the DoD knows best what it 
wants in terms of logistic services, but the vendor may know best how to provide those 
services.  PBL can be seen as an extension of the principle of “commander’s intent” in 
which leadership presents goals, but subordinates are encouraged to choose methods 
and processes (Apgar IV and Keane 2004).   
Within the field of behavioral decision making, there is a substantial literature 
which shows that decision makers use sub-optimal heuristics to value and negotiate 
agreements such as PBL contracts for services, and are subject to systematic biases in 
judgment when evaluating  performance  (Kahneman, Slovic et al. 1982).   In this paper, 
we draw a connection between the intent of PBL on the one hand, and the literature on 
biases and heuristics on the other.  Specifically, we review the literature on PBL and 
logistics service measurement as it relates to 1) the distinction between process and 
outcome measures and 2) the significance of risk.  We then review the literature on 
behavioral decision making and performance evaluation that relates to those same two 
topics, and develop hypotheses regarding 1) the potential impact of process 
measurement on outcome measurement, and 2) the absence of stated metrics and 
goals for the variance (risk) of outcomes.  We develop specific, testable hypotheses 
from this review of the literature, report on a test of these hypotheses in a laboratory 
experiment, and discuss the implications of our findings on practice. 
PBL is an evolving concept within the DoD, and clarification on the metrics which 
should be used to assess weapon system logistics outcomes has been recently issued 
which emphasizes that system-level outcomes such as operational availability should 
be used to evaluate PBL candidates and the performance of PBL providers (Wynne 
xi 
 2004).  The system-level emphasis of this clarification is significant and proper, as 
warfighting outcomes are clearly only impacted by system level (as opposed to 
component level) performance.   
But PBL is still being applied at the component level and there is no clear 
guidance (to our knowledge) on how to link component level variables like time-to-
failure to system level outcomes like operational availability.  Indeed, a recent 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that most of the 185 PBL 
contracts they were able to identify in the DoD were written at the component or 
subsystem level, and they suggested that contracting at the component level should 
continue to be preferred to contracting at the system level (GAO 2004).   
Even in the private sector, the measurement and performance assessment of 
logistic services is known to be a difficult task.  Proper valuation of the outcomes of 
logistic services (as opposed to merely valuing inputs, such as cost) must include some 
assessment of difficult to quantify factors such as customer satisfaction, and risk 
reduction (Lambert and Burduroglu 2000).  This outcome measurement problem is 
made more difficult because so many of the traditional logistics measures are process 
measures (Caplice and Sheffi 1994).  Nor is it easier when the services are provided to 
the DoD, where outcomes cannot be reduced to measurable quantities like profit or 
shareholder value (Camm, Blickstein et al. 2004). 
The DoD of course has no simple overarching valuation metric such as profit, 
and it has no simple revenue surrogates.  Valued outcomes have to do with military 
missions; thus, even if logistic services for a weapon system are provided at an 
aggregate level by a single provider, they are difficult to value and price.  At the level of 
a subassembly or single logistic element, the problem is compounded.  Unless decision 
makers have comprehensive models of weapon systems logistics, in which the 
important performance dimensions of all critical components are modeled, they cannot 
value a component-level contract in terms of system level outcomes like operational 
availability.  Such models have not been required, and we have no evidence that they 
are being used in the field. 
xii 
 In situations without clearly observable outcome measures and valuation 
functions, decision makers are known to place a heavy weight on surrogates such as 
process measures, or even input measures (Chinander and Schweitzer 2003).  Some of 
these may not correlate well with system-level outcomes.  Under PBL, decision makers 
must determine relevant outcomes for component level contracts and separate 
diagnostic measures (those that correlate well with desired system outcomes) from non-
diagnostic ones.  However, decision makers are known to pursue information even 
when it is non-diagnostic and non-instrumental (knowledge of the measure would not or 
should not change decisions).  Unfortunately, once obtained, such non-instrumental 
information may be treated as if it were instrumental (Bastardi and Shafir 1998).  That 
is, decision makers pursue information they do not need, then act upon it.  In our paper, 
we investigate this tendency in decision makers asked to evaluate provider performance 
under a hypothetical PBL contract. 
It might be claimed that additional information could never hurt the decision 
process (aside perhaps from the cost of gathering it) but at least two sets of research 
findings indicate that such confidence would be misplaced.   The curse of knowledge is 
a dysfunctional decision making pattern that occurs when a decision maker knows 
information that they would be better off to ignore, but they cannot ignore it (Camerer, 
Loewenstein et al. 1989).  The classic example is a wine merchant, who over prices his 
good wine, and under prices his bad wine and thus loses revenue on both sides from 
customers who do not know as much about wine as he does.  In our case, the decision 
maker who pursues non-diagnostic process information may misestimate provider 
performance because of it.   A related bias is the dilution effect:  the tendency for non-
diagnostic information to cause diagnostic information to be undervalued (Nisbett, 
Zukier et al. 1981).  In the case of PBL, if a decision maker captures process metrics, 
he or she may not be able to place them in the proper context relative to a system level 
outcome, and the impact of an important outcome metric may be diluted.  In our paper, 
we investigate the tendency of decision makers to dilute system outcomes when given 
knowledge of process variables. 
xiii 
 A special case of the misuse of non-diagnostic information is the use of 
information about inputs.  The input bias is the tendency to make judgments about the 
quality of outcomes based on the value of inputs (Chinander and Schweitzer 2003).  For 
example, people tend to judge the quality of a product or service higher when they have 
to wait longer for it (Maister 1985).  This bias is thought to play an especially significant 
role in evaluation when outcomes are difficult to observe or measure.  In the case of 
PBL contracts, the evaluation of proposals based solely on the relative cost of 
alternatives would be an example of an input bias.  Also, a performance evaluation that 
considered investments a provider made in achieving outcomes would be an example 
of an input bias.  In our paper, we investigate the susceptibility of decision makers to an 
input bias when evaluating the performance of logistic service providers. 
There are other reasons why decision makers may seek out component-level 
process measures, even when they have been directed to look at system level outcome 
measures.  Process measures allow a better degree of control over the internal 
workings of a process.  They may not reduce uncertainty around outcomes, but they do 
give decision makers a sense that outcomes are more directly under their control.  Risk 
preferences vary widely, but in addition to individual differences in risk aversion or risk 
seeking behavior, decision makers tend to prefer controllable to uncontrollable ones 
even to the extent that they will maintain illusions about the degree of control they have 
over a situation (Langer 1975).  The preference for controllable risks is said in part to be 
related to a general bias decision makers have that their own abilities are better than 
others (Howell 1971).  Of course, part of the logic of performance-based outsourcing is 
that providers are more capable of dealing with the internal processes of the logistics 
service.  But decision makers appear to maintain this preference for controllable risks, 
and to support their bias toward exaggerated self-assessments, even when they would 
be better off with less control (Klein and Kunda 1994). 
In delegating the decisions on how to accomplish outcome goals to a provider, 
programs seek to use PBL to transfer some of the process and financial risk of the 
logistic service to the provider; in contracting to deliver outcomes while assuming 
responsibility for processes, providers accept that risk at a specified price. The 
xiv 
 assessment of these risks is part of a business case analysis required for every 
implementation of PBL in the Navy (Young 2003).   To our knowledge however, DoD-
level PBL guidance does not require any specific measures of outcome risk, or process 
risk transfer.   
The biases and heuristics literature makes it clear that human decision makers 
are poor intuitive statisticians (Kahneman, Slovic et al. 1982).  However, as Cohen 
(1982) pointed out, if decision makers could intuitively grasp statistical concepts, what 
would be the point of offering classes in them? Whether it is a question of education or 
irrationality, it seems clear that most decision makers do not have an intuitive model that 
allows them to value variance in, for example, operational availability.  In our paper, we 
investigate the tendency for decision makers, even when trained in risk assessment, to 
undervalue the impact of outcome variance.     
The investigations in our paper are all made through laboratory experiments: 
questionnaires asking decision makers to evaluate PBL scenarios.  The results have 
only limited generalizability to the actual management of extant PBL contracts, or to the 
valuation and pricing of PBL contracts.  However, the results do have implications for 
the continued evolution of PBL, and the need for greater specificity in guidance.  That is, 
if decision makers under PBL are subject to the same limitations as decision makers in 
our study, it indicates the need for the DoD to develop specific guidance with regard to 
risk measurement and valuation, and to require comprehensive system-level models to 
value and price component level contracts, and evaluate component level logistic 
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 Introduction 
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) is an initiative that the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has targeted for ”aggressive implementation” in FY 2006-2009 
(Wolfowitz, 2004).  It is an initiative intended to improve weapon system logistics 
outcomes, and reduce weapon system lifecycle costs.  Important weapon system 
logistics outcomes have been defined (each of the following will be explained in more 
detail below) as operational availability, operational reliability, cost per usage, logistics 
footprint, and logistics response time (Wynne, 2004).   
PBL is different from traditional military logistics management in that program 
managers are supposed to dictate what a logistics service provider should deliver in 
terms of measurable outcomes, not how the delivery of those outcomes should be 
accomplished.   It can be seen as an extension of the principle of “commander’s intent” 
in which leadership presents goals, but subordinates are encouraged to choose 
methods and processes (Apgar & Keane, 2004).  Whether the service provider is an 
organic DoD organization or a private sector organization, it must enter into a 
contractual relationship with weapon system managers in which payment is based on 
performance relative to agreed-upon outcome goals. 
In delegating the decisions on how to accomplish outcome goals to a vendor, 
programs seek to use PBL to transfer some of the operational and financial risk of the 
methods and processes used to the vendor; and in contracting to deliver outcomes 
while assuming responsibility for processes, vendors accept that risk at a specified 
price. The assessment of these risks is part of a business case analysis required for 
every implementation of PBL in the Navy (Young, 2003).    
The measurement and performance assessment of logistic services is clearly a 
difficult task.  Cost reduction is not an adequate assessment of the strategic benefits of 
logistic services, which must include some assessment of difficult-to-quantify factors 
such as customer satisfaction and risk reduction (Lambert & Burduroglu, 2000).  This 
measurement problem is not made easier when an organization focuses on outcomes 
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 to be acquired—rather than processes to be monitored—because so many of the 
traditional logistics measures are process measures (Caplice & Sheffi, 1994).  Nor is it 
easier when the services are provided to the DoD, where outcomes cannot be valued in 
terms of profit or shareholder value (Camm, Blickstein et al., 2004). 
Indeed, it is one of the premises of this paper that because logistics is so often 
considered an internal process (or even a sub-process) of an activity, outcomes are 
difficult to value.  This is especially true for weapon systems logistics, in which even 
what are usually considered outcome measures (e.g., operational availability) have no 
one-to-one correspondence to recognizable outcomes valued by the DoD (e.g., mission 
success).  Without clearly observable (let alone valuable) outcome measures, decision 
makers are known to place a heavy weight on surrogates such as process measures, or 
even input measures (Chinander & Schweitzer, 2003).  We will investigate the potential 
for bias in performance evaluation created by the attempt to measure and value system-
level outcomes, when the services contracted are only sub-processes of weapon 
system operations and support. 
Another premise of this paper is that the risk transfer intended by delegating 
processes must be assessed through the measurement of outcome variance.  After all, 
risk, in Finance or Logistics, is synonymous with variance.  In allowing a vendor to 
choose methods and processes, a manager must hold him or her accountable for the 
reliable delivery of outcomes.  One DoD organization, in issuing guidance for vendor 
management under PBL, stated the following: 
Minimal contract management involvement is anticipated as long as the 
contractor meets contractually specified performance metrics.  However, our 
involvement may increase if the contractor systems and processes are not 
functioning correctly and end users are not appropriately supported. (Bogusz, 
Taylor et al., 2002)   
In our opinion, true risk transfer has not taken place if ”involvement may 
increase” when contractor processes are not functioning correctly.  If the vendor is not 
responsible for correcting the variance in their processes, then the DoD is still in the 
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 business of managing processes, not outcomes, and should continue to measure 
processes as well as outcomes (and should not be paying someone else for the 
management of the process).  This is not to say that a manager should simply ignore 
the potential impact of process variance.  But consequential process variance will show 
up in outcome variance as well, and outcome variance is itself an important 
performance dimension. 
For example, if a vendor has contracted to provide a certain level of operational 
availability for a component, one of the sub-processes that will determine operational 
availability is maintenance lead time.  Problems (variance) in the sub-process of 
maintenance lead time will create variance in operational availability.  That is, one does 
not need to monitor a sub-process to observe the impact of the variance of that sub-
process:  it can be observed through variance in system-level outcomes.  Of course, 
variance in operational availability is itself an important performance dimension, as it 
determines the risk that the number of mission-capable assets will fall below some 
planning threshold.  But in addition to determining direct performance implications of 
outcome variance, by monitoring outcome variance, the DoD implicitly monitors 
variance (risk) in all of the sub-processes that determine that outcome.  Risk can be 
said to have been successfully transferred only when operational (or financial) risk has 
been reduced. 
 In the next section, we will review the literature on PBL and logistics service 
measurement as it relates to: 1) the distinction between process and outcome 
measures and 2) the significance of risk.  We will then review the literature on 
behavioral decision making and performance evaluation that relates to those same two 
topics, and develop hypotheses regarding: 1) the potential impact of process 
measurement on outcome measurement and 2) the absence of stated metrics and 
goals for the variance of outcomes.  We will develop specific, testable hypotheses from 
this review of the literature.  Next, we will report on preliminary findings relating to the 
development of an instrument to test two of our hypotheses.  Finally, we will discuss the 
implications of our hypotheses and managerial implications, should support for them be 















 PBL, Logistics Measurement and Behavioral 
Decision-Making Research 
The key word in Performance-Based Logistics is “performance,” which means 
“specification and valuation of outcome rather than process.”  There are a number of 
other related US Government and DoD initiatives which use the word performance in 
this way—for example, Performance-Based Service Contracting (OFPP, 1998) and 
Performance-Based Service Acquisition (DUSD-DAR, 2000).  The use of the term 
performance in all of these initiatives is at least in part intended to imply a break from 
the past, which is seen as involving needlessly complex specification and micro-
management of vendor processes, when vendors sometimes understand the methods 
of service delivery better than the governmental customer who is buying the service.   
Vendor evaluation in “performance” initiatives is intended to center on clearly specified 
outcome metrics and mutually-agreed upon goals on those metrics (DUSD-LMR, 2001), 
with the idea that the DoD knows best what it wants in terms of logistic services, but the 
vendor may know best how to provide those services.   
Logistic services present a problem in this regard, however, because many 
aspects of performance—especially those relating to the benefits (and not the costs) of 
the service—deal with difficult-to-measure factors such as customer perception of 
service quality (Mentzer, Flint et al., 1999)  or customer value added (Lambert & 
Burduroglu, 2000).  Also, the vast majority of logistic services measures involve what 
have been called “utilization” measures (ratios of actual to normalized inputs) or 
“productivity” measures (ratios of actual output to actual input) on single resources—in 
other words, sub-processes within the logistic service, such as items picked/man-hour 
in a warehouse.  Few total factor “effectiveness” measures (ratios of outcomes to 
normalized outcomes, or goals) are used (Caplice & Sheffi, 1994).  But these are 
precisely the sorts of measures prescribed under PBL. 
Weapon system logistics may be even more difficult to assess in terms of 
outcomes because the relationship between support services and mission outcomes 
valued by the DoD is even more attenuated than the relationship between support 
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 services and profit in the commercial sector (Doerr, Lewis et al., in press).  Finally, PBL 
has been implemented for individual logistic elements (e.g., inventory alone or repair 
alone) at the component or sub-assembly level of weapons systems.  The relationship 
between logistic support services at the component or individual logistic-element level, 
and outcomes at the weapon-system level is difficult to determine and probabilistic in 
nature, as it depends on the performance of the other critical components and logistical 
elements that determine overall system performance. 
In the past, measures have been recommended for PBL contracts that are 
clearly process, and not outcome measures.  For example, Fill Rate or back-order aging 
rates have been suggested (Bogusz, Taylor et al., 2002).  When measured at a 
component level (e.g., fill rate for a fuel cell), the connection of these measurements to 
system-level outcomes is so tenuous as to be impossible to determine in isolation from 
the process metrics of other major components (Kang, Doerr et al., 2005).  In recent 
high-level guidance for PBL, the DoD has made it clear that system-level performance 
(outcome) metrics should be negotiated with a PBL vendor.  A recent memo from the 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Wynne, 
2004) listed five key performance criteria:  1) weapon system operational availability,  2) 
weapon system operational reliability, 3) weapon system cost per usage, 4) logistics 
footprint for a weapon system, and 5) response time required for weapon system 
logistics support.  However, even in this reduced subset of important variables, aspects 
of reliability (time to failure for a component) and logistics footprint (spares inventory 
levels in the field) can be seen as process variables which help to determine the 
”outcome” of operational availability.   
Moreover, PBL is still being applied at the subsystem, or major assembly level, 
and there is no clear guidance on how to link component-level variables like time-to-
failure to system-level outcomes like operational availability.  Indeed, a recent GAO 
report found that most of the 185 PBL contracts they were able to identify in the DoD 
were written at the component or subsystem level, and they suggested that contracting 
at that level should be preferred to contracting at the platform, or system level (GAO, 
2004).  This GAO recommendation seems, in large part, to have been justified on the 
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 basis of commercial practices; nowhere does it address the significant difference 
between DoD and private-sector logistics in terms of relating component-level variables 
such as component reliability or availability to system-level outcomes.  In the private 
sector, the central financial valuation question in such a contract (i.e., the question of 
how to price it—apart from any strategic consideration) would revolve around the cost 
and revenue implications: if the rate of return of the contract was predicted to exceed a 
corporate hurdle rate for profitability, it would likely be adopted (depending, in addition 
on the strategic considerations).   
The DoD, of course, has no simple valuation metric such as profit, and it has no 
simple revenue surrogates.  Valued outcomes have to do with military missions, and the 
driving surrogate for those (from the logistics point of view) is readiness.  And while 
readiness as a surrogate may be seen to beg the question of valuation (e.g., how ready 
for what mission contingency?), its common operationalization as Ao (operational 
availability) is even more distal.  Thus, even if logistic services for a weapon system are 
provided at an aggregate level by a single provider, they are difficult to value and price.  
At the level of a subassembly or single logistic element, the problem is compounded.  
Reducing mean time to repair for an auxiliary power unit (APU), for example, may 
increase the probability that a spare APU will be on the shelf if needed (though even 
that relationship is not trivial to derive); but, the impact of this higher probability on Ao of 
an aircraft depends on the sparing level, failure rates, and time to repair of all the other 
critical components of the aircraft.  Unless decision makers have comprehensive 
models of weapons systems logistics, in which the important performance dimensions 
of all critical components are modeled, they cannot value a component-level contract in 
terms of system-level outcome surrogates like Ao.  Such models have not been 
required, and we have no evidence that they are being used in the field. 
So, if component-level contracts are not being valued in terms of system-level 
outcomes, how are new contracts being valued and priced?  And how is performance 
on ongoing component-level contracts being evaluated?  This, of course, is an empirical 
question, and we have no field evidence to address this question one way or the other.  
However, we can draw on a substantial literature in the domain of behavioral decision 
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 making to build hypotheses about how decision makers typically value and evaluate 
performance when outcomes are difficult to observe or measure. 
There is a substantial literature to suggest that decision makers (even in 
unambiguous situations) use sub-optimal heuristics to solve problems and are subject 
to biases in judgment (Kahneman, Slovic et al., 1982).  In PBL, we think measurement 
and valuation difficulties will promote certain biases and cause decision makers to 
overlook important aspects of valuation (risk).  These difficulties include the distal 
relationship between component-level processes and system-level outcomes, and the 
difficulty of proper valuation of variance in outcome measures. 
There has been research which suggests that performance-based evaluation 
may itself create judgmental bias.  The outcome bias is the tendency to assume that 
outcomes and processes are more strongly related than they really are—that correct 
process decisions lead to desired outcomes, even when they do not (Baron & Hershey, 
1988).  Because good decisions may sometimes lead to bad outcomes (and vice-
versa), some degree of evaluation based on processes themselves seems normatively 
preferable.  There has been some debate about whether judgment based solely on 
outcome might be justified at all (Hershey & Baron, 1992; Lipshitz, 1995); yet, a 
situation in which the decision maker knows relatively little about the processes used to 
obtain the outcome has been said to be indicative of a case where judgment by 
outcome might be preferred. 
Even taking the premise of judgment-by-outcome as given for PBL, there 
remains the problem of determining relevant outcomes for component-level contracts 
and separating diagnostic measures (those that correlate well with desired system 
outcomes) from non-diagnostic ones.  Although guidance has been given as to the 
nature of system-level outcome measures that should be included in PBL contracts 
(Wynne, 2004), there has been no clear guidance (to our knowledge) on how to relate 
sub-system processes and outcomes to system outcomes, and no strict guidance that 
managers should limit evaluation to those metrics that relate to system-level outcomes.  
In situations with uncertainty, decision makers are known to pursue information even 
when it is non-diagnostic and non-instrumental (knowledge of the measure would not or 
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 should not change decisions).  Unfortunately, once obtained, such non-instrumental 
information may be treated as if it were instrumental (Bastardi & Shafir, 1998).  That is, 
decision makers pursue information they do not need, then act upon it. 
Logistic services, as already noted, are difficult to measure, and a large number 
of process metrics have been used for various logistics elements (Caplice & Sheffi, 
1994).  When applied at a component level, many of these metrics will correlate at least 
to some degree with system-level outcomes such as operational availability (though 
some will not).  But the precise nature of the relationship between a logistics measure 
such as warehouse turnover for a certain type of tire, and operational availability of a jet 
is quite difficult to determine.  Given the abundance of such measures, however, and 
the difficulty of the task of measuring system outcomes, we think it is likely that decision 
makers will pursue such non-diagnostic, or partially diagnostic information about the 
logistic processes of components under PBL contracts. 
Hypothesis 1:  In evaluating vendor performance for outsourced logistics 
services, decision makers will seek out process measures that only partially correlate 
with system-level outcomes, even when they are given system outcome measurements. 
This would not necessarily be a problem (indeed, according to the tenets of the 
outcome bias, it might be beneficial) were it not for the very quantity of process 
measures available, and the difficulty of discerning those that might be the most 
instrumental from those likely to be the least.  It might be claimed that additional 
information could never hurt the decision process (aside perhaps from the cost of 
gathering it), but at least two sets of research findings indicate that such confidence 
would be misplaced.   
The curse of knowledge is a dysfunctional decision-making pattern that occurs 
when decision makers know information they would be better off to ignore, but once 
they know it, they cannot ignore it (Camerer, Loewenstein et al., 1989).  The classic 
example is a wine merchant who over-prices his good wine and under-prices his bad 
wine because he “knows” about his wine. He, thus, loses revenue on both sides from 
customers who do not know as much about wine as he does.  In our case, the decision 
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 maker who pursues non-diagnostic process information may tend to overvalue vendor 
performance (if the non-diagnostic numbers were better than the system outcome 
metrics) or undervalue it (if the non-diagnostic numbers were worse than the system 
outcome metrics).  
Another related bias is the dilution effect:  the tendency for large quantities of 
non-diagnostic information to cause diagnostic information to be undervalued (Nisbett, 
Zukier et al., 1981).  In the case of PBL, if a decision maker captures large numbers of 
logistic process metrics, the impact of an important outcome metric may be overlooked. 
Hypothesis 2:  Decision makers given non-diagnostic or partially diagnostic 
information about component-level processes will use it to moderate their evaluations of 
system-level outcomes.       
A special case of the misuse of non-diagnostic information is the use of 
information about inputs.  The input bias is the tendency to make judgments about the 
quality of outcomes based on the value of inputs (Chinander & Schweitzer, 2003).  For 
example, people tend to judge the quality of a product or service higher when they have 
to wait longer for it (Maister, 1985).  This bias is thought to play an especially significant 
role in evaluation when outcomes are difficult to observe or measure.  In the case of 
PBL contracts, the evaluation of proposals based solely on the relative cost of 
alternatives would be an example of an input bias.  Also, a performance evaluation that 
considered investments a vendor made in achieving outcomes would be an example of 
an input bias. 
Hypothesis 3:  Decision makers will use input information such as cost or effort 
expended on component-level processes to moderate their judgments of system-level 
outcomes.     
There are other reasons why decision makers may seek out component-level 
process measures, even when they have been directed to use system-level outcome 
measures.  Process measures allow a better degree of control over the internal 
workings of a process.  They may not reduce uncertainty around outcomes, but they do 
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 give decision makers a sense that outcomes are more directly under their control.  
Under PBL, decision makers are supposed to avoid the temptation to exercise process 
control, and specify and evaluate contractors based solely on outcomes.  However, this 
intention seems hard to realize.  When we first presented data we had gathered that 
indicated some stakeholders in the PBL process felt it entailed ”too many metrics,” a 
DoD decision maker raised the objection that the number of metrics was irrelevant, and 
pointed out that pilots have a superabundance of indicators in their cockpits, most of 
which they ignore unless something is going wrong.  But of course, under performance-
based contracting, one isn’t supposed to be flying the plane: one is supposed to be 
buying a ticket to ride as a passenger.   
Risk preferences vary widely, but in addition to individual differences in risk-
aversion or risk-seeking behavior, decision makers tend to prefer controllable to 
uncontrollable risk even to the extent that they will maintain illusions about the degree of 
control they have over a situation (Langer, 1975).  The preference for controllable risks 
is said, in part, to be related to a general bias decision makers have that their own 
abilities are better than others’ (Howell, 1971).  Of course, part of the logic of 
performance-based outsourcing is that vendors are more capable of dealing with the 
internal processes of the service.  But decision makers appear to maintain a preference 
for controllable risks, and to support their bias toward exaggerated self-assessments, 
even when they would be better off with less control (Klein & Kunda, 1994). 
Finally, as already noted, we think the variance (risk) associated with outcomes 
is itself an important performance measure that should be explicitly considered in 
valuing and evaluating outsourced logistic services.  This is both because (process) risk 
transfer is an intended outcome of PBL (and, hence, it should be measured to see if that 
outcome is obtained), but also because variance in outcomes directly affects 
contingency planning for operations.  Unfortunately, while PBL guidance clearly 
indicates the importance of risk (Young, 2003), that guidance does not require specific 
measures of risk.  The biases and heuristics literature makes it clear that human 
decision makers are poor intuitive statisticians (Kahneman, Slovic et al., 1982).  Indeed, 
one of the early criticisms of the research on biases and heuristics is that in part, it 
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 merely represents a set of tests of intelligence or educational achievement (Cohen, 
1982):  if decision makers could intuitively grasp statistical concepts, what would be the 
point of offering classes in them? It would be beyond the scope of this paper to 
document the many intuitive heuristics decision makers use to deal with uncertainty and 
risk.  Whether it is a question of education or irrationality, however, it seems clear that 
most decision makers do not have an intuitive model that would allow them to value 
variance in, for example, operational availability.     
Hypothesis 4:  Decision Makers will undervalue or ignore information about 




 Scale Development and Results of a Pilot Experiment 
In this section we describe both the results of a scale development effort to 
measure vendor performance and pilot results from data collected to help validate the 
scale.  Findings are also given from these pilot data that relate to two of our hypotheses. 
Participants.   
Participants were 63 professional military officers enrolled in an MBA program at 
a public university.  The average participant age was 33.6 years with an average of 11.7 
years of active duty service; 86.7 percent of the participants were male.  Participants 
had an average of 4.3 years of experience in logistics and 1.3 years of experience in 
contract management.  66.7 percent of the participants indicated prior knowledge of 
PBL. 
Protocol. 
Participants were given a short description of a scenario in which the depot-level 
support of a weapon system component was outsourced to a vendor.  Participants were 
told that the component, weapon system and vendor were fictitious.  They were told that 
their responses were to be used to assess biases based on variance in decision 
scenarios.  Each participant was given one of three scenarios, as described below.  No 
extra credit was given for participation in the study, and participants were assured both 
of the confidentiality of their responses and the voluntary nature of their participation. 
Instrument. 
All participants were given the same two-page scenario description.  The 
description stated that the primary weapon system outcome of concern was Operational 
Availability.  The description also pointed out that the component which had been 
outsourced to the vendor was only 1 component of many which determined operational 
availability for the weapon system; and depot-level maintenance of that component was 
only one logistical element of many which determined the performance of that 
component in the aircraft.  See Figure 1. 
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 Figure 1.  Graphic Given to Participants to Support Description of Depot-Level 



























The three forms of the instrument differed in the data that was presented to the 
participants.  In the base case, participants were given only data on how many weapon 
systems (aircraft) were down due to failure of the component.  As aircraft availability 
was stated to be the outcome of concern, the data provided was a good outcome 
surrogate.  Weekly data were provided from a two-year period (prior year and contract 
year), and the average number of aircraft down due to BQV failure was shown to have 
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 increased slightly during the contract year from the prior year (i.e., performance 
worsened).   
In the second form of the instrument, in addition to the outcome information, 
participants were also given data from process measures which only partially correlated 
with the outcome of concern.  In particular, participants were given weekly data from a 
two-year period (prior year and contract year) on the average mean time between 
failures for engines in a given week, average repair cycle time, and average days to 
supply backorders.  In each case, the impact on system performance cannot be 
determined directly from the numbers.  However, in each case, performance on these 
process measures improved slightly from the prior year to the contract year. 
In the third form of the instrument, participants were not given the process 
measures, but attention was drawn to the variability of the outcome (number of aircraft 
down due to component failure).  The only additional piece of information given to the 
participants on the third form was the standard deviation of the outcome for each year.  
Variance in the contract year had been reduced by a factor of four compared to the prior 
year, from 14.3% standard deviation in aircraft availability to 6.0% standard deviation in 
aircraft availability.  In other words, while average performance was very slightly worse 
in the contract year compared to the prior year, performance was far more reliable in the 
contract year.  In the base case, the participants were given weekly data from 2 years 
(52 x 2 numbers), but the standard deviation was not given.  The participants in the 
base case could have calculated the number themselves, or simply observed the large 
decrease in variability by carefully checking the data; however, they were not directed to 
do so.  On the third form of the instrument, the standard deviation of outcomes was 
given in order to draw attention to the reduction in variability. 
Every participant answered the same seven questions.  There were 6 items in 
the survey intended to provide a global assessment of vendor performance (this was 
the scale being piloted) and a seventh item asking participants to set a performance 
award for the vendor (0-5 percent of cost bonus).  The seventh item was intended to 
provide a check of convergent validity for the first six items.  The six items in the vendor 




















Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess internal reliability of the six-item scale.  
Independent sample t-tests were used to assess differences between participants’ 
responses when given one of the two ”treatment” forms (containing additional data) and 
participants’ responses when given the base-case form.  Congruence between outcome 
variables (six-item scale or percentage award) was assessed qualitatively by examining 
descriptive statistics and the outcome of t-tests run using each of the outcome 
variables. 
Results. 
Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for each of the two 
dependent variables are given in Table 1 for all three participant groups.   













14.3, 3.7 17.4, 4.4 16.6, 3.8 
Percent 
Award 
0.8, 1.2 0.5, 0.8 1.5, 1.2 
 
 
The six-item vendor performance scale exhibited reasonable internal reliability on 
this sample (α = .791, N = 61).   
17 
 Independent sample t-tests showed mixed support for Hypothesis 2.  Although 
participants’ performance evaluation increased when given data on process measures (t 
= 2.116, p = .022), their percentage award to the vendor did not increase (t = -0.854, p = 
.20).  The failure to find the predicted result for the percentage award result may be 
partially be due to a combination of high variance (the coefficient of variation is greater 
than one for both groups, and the t-test is not significant) and a truncation effect (a large 
number of participants gave zero award in both groups).   
Independent sample t-tests showed strong support for Hypothesis 4.  On both 
the performance evaluation scale (t = 1.782, p = .043) and the percentage award (t =  
1.586, p = .062), evaluations were significantly higher when the difference in variance 
was made plain by printing the standard deviation with the data. 
The results show, at best, mixed support for the convergent validity of the 
performance-evaluation scale and percentage-bonus awards.  This may be due to 
technical issues with the percentage-award scale (noted above) or it may be that 
participants viewed performance evaluation (as measured by the six-item scale) as 





 Limitations, Discussion and Conclusion 
The primary purpose of the pilot data collection was to validate a scale for use in 
further testing; however, since we have reported results from this pilot experiment, we 
should also make clear a number of limitations to interpreting the results.  First, a 
number of controls and manipulation checks were omitted in the pilot experiment.  For 
example, while we tried to make it clear that system availability was the important 
weapon system outcome to be assessed in the pilot, we did not perform a manipulation 
check to make sure that participants understood this.  Also, while demographic data 
were gathered, no attempt was made on these pilot data to ascertain if these variables 
explained a significant amount of variance in the dependent variables.  Future work, for 
example, should treat experience with contracting and logistics as a control variable.  
Finally, while we have been able to report preliminary support for two of our hypotheses, 
the other two hypotheses could not be tested with the pilot instrument. 
In our review of the literature, we have drawn a connection between the intent of 
performance-based service contracting and PBL on the one hand, and the literature on 
biases and heuristics on the other.  We have shown that the core intentions of 
performance-based contracting—evaluating performance based on outcomes rather 
than processes—is itself held in question by decision-making researchers.   
We have seen from a review of the logistics measurement literature that logistic 
services themselves are hard to value and evaluate, in part because outcomes are 
difficult to quantify.  In such a circumstance, behavioral decision research suggests that 
decision makers will use outcome surrogates, including inputs, to value outcomes.  If 
these strategies are also used in PBL services, their usage would indicate a greater 
need for guidance in the outcome measures that should be used for PBL contract 
management. 
Much of the earlier guidance on PBL insisted upon the idea that there was not 
“one best way” to implement PBL, and that measurement, consequently, would also 
need to vary from contract to contract.  While more specific guidance has been given in 
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 the last year clarifying that the important performance outcomes under PBL are at the 
system level, to our knowledge little specific guidance has been given on the precise 
mechanisms to be used to connect component-level performance with system-level 
outcomes.  Under such ambiguity, we have seen that behavioral decision making 
researchers predict that decision makers will seek out and use process measures that 
are non-diagnostic (not relevant to the evaluation task) or only partially diagnostic of 
outcomes.  Our pilot data provided mixed and limited support for the idea that decision 
makers will use process measures, even when told that outcomes are more valued, and 
even when given clear outcome measures.  Whether decision makers will actually seek 
out such process data (Hypothesis 1) remains untested. 
Finally, in reviewing the literature on PBL, we have noted that one of the primary 
intentions of the initiative is to outsource process risk.  We have noted that process risk 
connects to outcome performance through outcome variance, and that it is possible to 
evaluate the success of process risk transfer without measuring processes directly, but 
merely through a direct evaluation of outcome variance.  However, we have also noted 
that one of the core lessons of the behavioral decision making literature is that 
managers are especially poor intuitive statisticians, rely heavily on heuristics such as 
representativeness to assess probability, and are subject to the influence of a number of 
biases (such as base rate neglect).  Our pilot data have provided limited support for the 
idea that decision makers will simply neglect variance information unless it is made 
salient.  If decision makers under PBL are subject to the same limitations—if further 
support is found for our Hypothesis 4—that data indicates the need for the DoD to 
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 Appendix 1. Component Logistic Service Vendor 
Performance Scale 
 
(Note: the BQV is a fictitious component in the H-80, a fictitious aircraft.  The contract 
year reviewed was 2003.  All items were measured on a five-point scale, in which one 
was “strongly disagree,” three was “neutral,” and five was “strongly agree.”) 
 
 
1. Logistical support of the BQV for the H-80 was good in 2003. 
2. The vendor improved logistical support outcomes of the BQV in 2003 to above 
performance in 2002. 
3. The BQV vendor provided better response in support of the H-80 in 2003 than in 
2002. 
4. The vendor improved performance outcomes of the BQV in 2003 to above 
performance in 2002. 
5. The vendor improved service levels in 2003 to above service levels in 2002. 
6. Squadrons were less likely to be short a BQV for an H-80 in 2003 than they were 
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